2 Reynolds argued that the Free Exercise Clause required an exemption from otherwise valid criminal laws, but the Court rejected his argument. 3 The Chief Justice of the Court wrote:
[A]s a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. 4 More than 100 years later, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Court rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge to an Oregon law that included "religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug" and permitted Oregon "to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired use." 5 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, invoked Reynolds in reaching his conclusion: MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [ 9 7 : 4 exemption for "religious employers"; 10 an exemption for "grandfathered" health plans;
11 a temporary safe-harbor provision ensuring that no department will take enforcement action against nonprofit employers and their group health plans that "on and after February 10, 2012, do not provide some or all of the contraceptive coverage otherwise required, consistent with any applicable State law, because of the religious beliefs of the organization"; 12 and an exemption for employers with fewer than fifty employees, which do not have to provide employees with a health insurance plan. 13 Prior to the litigation organized by the Catholic Bishops, the Obama administration proposed a compromise, 14 but that did not satisfy the Catholic Bishops, 15 so they, and others, proceeded with the litigation. 16 Several weeks after the litigation was initiated, the Catholic Health Association (CHA), comprised of 2,000 Catholic hospitals, health systems, and related organizations, expressed its deep concern about the compromise, even though it had initially supported it. 13. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2012) . 14. See Office of the Press Sec'y, White House, Fact Sheet: Women's Preventive Services and Religious Institutions, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 10, 2012) , http://www.whitehouse.gov/the -press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-s-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions. The Fact Sheet states:
Under the new policy to be announced today, women will have free preventive care that includes contraceptive services no matter where she works. The policy also ensures that if a woman works for a religious employer with objections to providing contraceptive services as part of its health plan, the religious employer will not be required to provide, pay for or refer for contraception coverage, but her insurance company will be required to directly offer her contraceptive care free of charge.
Id.
15. See Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8; see also infra note 17 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8. 18. See RACHEL K. JONES & JOERG DREWEKE, COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: NEW EVIDENCE ON RELIGION AND CONTRACEPTIVE USE 3-8 (2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/Religion-and-Contraceptive-Use.pdf (noting that among "sexually active women who are not pregnant, postpartum or trying to get pregnant," 68% of Catholic women in that universe used "highly effective methods"-32% sterilization, 31% pill, and 5% IUD). In Thomas v 3. If the president is forced to withdraw, how will that fact be used? Will it be used to link the church with racist and other extremist elements in our country? Will the banishment of the first African-American president from Catholic university campuses be seen as grossly insensitive to the heritage of racial hatred which has burdened our country for far too long? Will it be used to paint the bishops as supporters of one political party over another? Will this action be seen as proof that the bishops of the United States do not sincerely seek dialogue on major policy questions, but only acquiescence? In effect, the Catholic Bishops are asking government to help enforce their anti-contraception rule by punishing those Catholics who choose to use prescription contraceptives. Is requiring the "good" Catholic employees of a Catholic religious institution covered by the PPACA, who participate in its health insurance program but choose not to use the contraception benefit, to subsidize the "bad" Catholic employees, who use their health insurance to purchase prescriptive contraceptives, a greater infringement of religious freedom or freedom of conscience than the government-imposed obligation to support religious instruction or worship through an educational voucher program that benefits primarily Catholic elementary and secondary schools?
Emily Douglas, Catholic Health Association Pulls Support from Contraception

27
In short, the Catholic Bishops want to promote their institutional religious freedom even though that freedom is often at the expense of individuals' freedom, including many Catholic women who support and 26. Of course, they are free to purchase prescription contraceptives but not all women have the financial resources to do so. The "non-conforming" Catholics are free to work for an employer that complies with the PPACA, just as the Catholic institutions are free to avoid becoming an "employer. It goes on to say that government is free to make these services more readily available; however, "the Government seeks to require Plaintiffs-all Catholic entities-to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs by providing, paying for, and/or facilitating access to those services." 33 These Catholic entities "provide a wide range of spiritual, educational, and social services to residents in the greater Washington, D.C., community, Catholic and non-Catholic alike." 34 Students enrolled in the archdiocesan schools "are taught faith-not just the basics of Christianity, but how to have a relationship with God that will remain with them after they leave their Catholic school." 35 In summarizing the work of the Archdiocese, the complaint says "[it]-and the entire Catholic Church-is committed to serving anyone in need, regardless of religion," and "[i]n addition to serving individuals of all faiths, [it] also 31. Id.
Any "religious employer" is exempt from the contraception services requirement. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2012) ; see also infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. "Religious employer" is defined as an organization that meets four criteria: (1) its purpose is the "inculcation of religious values"; (2) it employs primarily "persons who share [its] religious tenets"; (3) it "serves primarily persons who share [its] religious tenets"; and (4) it "is a nonprofit organization," as described in the Internal Revenue Code. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B). Further, only "large employers," those with at least fifty employees, are covered by the requirement. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A).
32. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶ 1. 33. Id. What exactly is the sincerely held religious belief of these entities-that Catholics should not use contraception, or that Catholics should neither use nor subsidize others' use of contraception? If it means the latter, is it improper for such an entity to pay wages to someone who uses the wages to purchase either contraception or an abortion? It is not clear who is financing the litigation, but it is certainly possible that the contributions of individual Catholics who favor and support the challenged provisions of the PPACA are being utilized, contrary to their sincerely held beliefs, based on their version of Catholicism so that Catholic employers should make full benefits available to all employees. 36. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶ ¶ 37-38. What the complaint omits is the fact that the Archdiocese wants to be allowed to impose its religious beliefs related to prescriptive contraceptives on all of those students and employees. See generally id. Of course, no student is required by law to attend a Catholic school, and no one is required to work for a Catholic employer; similarly, no Catholic institution is required by law to establish a school or become an employer, or if it chooses to become an employer and has less than fifty employees, make health insurance available.
See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A).
37. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶ ¶ 1, 37. For example, it appears that a woman in need because she used her scarce resources to pay for an abortion would be eligible for assistance from the Archdiocese. Id. ¶ ¶ 223-32 (Count IV) (claiming the "narrow exemption for certain 'religious employers' but not others discriminates on the basis of religious views or religious status"). This claim could be addressed by eliminating the "narrow exemption." 42. Id. ¶ ¶ 233-47 (Count V) (claiming the law interferes with the plaintiffs' internal decisions in that the plaintiff institutions must comply with the decision of the Catholic Church on "these issues"). This argument appears to be a stretch because the government is not interpreting church doctrine; rather, it is imposing a requirement that the plaintiffs say is inconsistent with church doctrine, as in Smith. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990).
43. Complaint, Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra note 8, ¶ ¶ 248-61 (Count VI) (claiming the law compels the plaintiffs "to subsidize, promote, and facilitate education and counseling services regarding [practices that violate their religious beliefs]"). As a taxpayer in
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The Catholic Bishops' claim that "the Government seeks to require Plaintiffs-all Catholic entities-to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs by providing, paying for, and/or facilitating access to those services,"
45 if accurate, is the result of a series of non-government decisions made independent of PPACA. Any alleged conflict between "sincerely held religious beliefs" 46 and the requirements of the PPACA arises only because the Catholic entities decided voluntarily to become employers and provide health insurance, and because of "a series of independent decisions by health care providers and patients covered by [ Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees. Congress drew a line in [26 U.S.C.] § 1402(g), exempting the selfemployed Amish but not all persons working for an Amish employer. The tax imposed on employers to support the social security system must be uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise. However, the challenged regulations do not demand that plaintiffs alter their behavior in a manner that will directly and inevitably prevent plaintiffs from acting in accordance with their religious beliefs. Frank O'Brien is not prevented from keeping the Sabbath, from providing a religious upbringing for his children, or from participating in a religious ritual such as communion. Instead, plaintiffs remain free to exercise their religion, by not using contraceptives and by discouraging employees from using contraceptives. The burden of which plaintiffs complain is that funds, which plaintiffs will contribute to a group health plan, might, after a series of independent decisions by health care providers and patients covered by [O'Brien Industrial Holdings'] plan, subsidize someone else's participation in an activity that is condemned by plaintiffs' religion. This [c]ourt rejects the proposition that requiring indirect financial support of a practice, from which plaintiff himself abstains according to his religious principles, constitutes a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious exercise. 49 RFRA, according to the court in O'Brien, "is a shield, not a sword" and is "not a means to force one's religious practices upon others." 
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Referring to the burden on the plaintiffs as remote, the court indicated that "the health care plan will offend plaintiffs' religious beliefs only if an [O'Brien Industrial Holdings] employee (or covered family member) makes an independent decision to use the plan to cover counseling related to or the purchase of contraceptives."
51
In short, what the Catholic Bishops complain of actually happens as a result of a series of independent private decisions, not directly as a result of the requirements of PPACA and its implementing regulations.
III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
52 This is confirmed by several post-Sherbert cases challenging the denial of unemployment compensation benefits to individuals who lost their jobs for refusing to work in a manner that they believed was inconsistent with their religious beliefs. 53 Between Sherbert and Smith, it was generally assumed that Free Exercise Clause claims trigger strict scrutiny, requiring the government to show a compelling interest and a close connection between its interest and the means utilized to achieve that interest. 54 Nevertheless, despite the heavy burden that strict scrutiny supposedly imposes, the government was generally successful in defeating Free Exercise Clause claims that did not challenge the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. 425, 439 (2006) , the Supreme Court applied RFRA to the federal government and held that the religious use of a tea for communion is protected, even though it appears on Schedule I of the Controlled Substance Act. However, the Court did not expressly address whether RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal government. Id. at 438-39. While Gonzales may support a challenge to the contraception mandate in the PPACA, it is possible to give effect to both statutes by upholding the PPACA on the grounds that it does not impose a substantial burden on religion, and it is the least restrictive means of The same year RFRA was passed, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court applied strict scrutiny and found a violation of the Free Exercise Clause because the city ordinance at issue was specifically aimed at the Santeria worship service. 61 In other words, the city ordinance was neither religion-neutral nor a law of general applicability, and therefore, Smith did not control. 62 Later, in Locke v. Davey, the Court rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge to a state scholarship program designed to assist academically gifted students with post-secondary education expenses, but the scholarship was not available to a student who pursued a degree in theology at an eligible educational institution. 63 Here, the Court distinguished Lukumi, stating "[f]ar from evincing the hostility toward religion which was manifest in Lukumi, we believe that the entirety of the Promise Scholarship Program goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits." 64 While the state could have funded the education at issue without violating the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 65 the Court concluded that the state's interest in not funding pursuit of a devotional degree, in light of the state constitutional provision prohibiting appropriation of public money "to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment," 66 is "substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars." 67 In sum, since 1990 the Free Exercise Clause has not been a reliable source of religious freedom except in situations where government takes enjoining application of the contraception requirement in PPACA to the plaintiffs, based on the religious objections of the owners of a private, secular, for-profit corporation, and summarily concluding, based on Wilgus, that the RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal government), aff ' The "hybrid" cases provide little comfort because, in those relatively rare cases, religious freedom depends on other constitutional provisions, such as substantive due process in Yoder. 69 After Flores and its narrow interpretation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a broad federal legislative fix aimed at state and local government is unlikely. 70 While it is beyond the scope of this Article, reasonable people can differ on whether Smith and its rational basis approach to religion-neutral, generally applicable rules provides the proper interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. The question is whether religious freedom really requires that all legislation be gerrymandered to avoid conflict with religious practices.
In recent years, the Court has also limited the Establishment Clause as a source of religious freedom. First, as the Court held in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, government is now free to subsidize religious instruction and worship under the guise of private choice in directing government-issued educational vouchers to religious schools.
71
The Court had previously ruled in Mitchell v. Helms that government is free to provide materials and equipment to private religious schools with little concern about diversion of the government subsidy for use in furtherance of religious purposes. 72 Justice O'Connor, along with Justice Breyer, supplied necessary votes in Mitchell, but expressed concern about actual diversion because of the absence of true private choice. 
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CATHOLIC BISHOPS 9 6 3 perceived the education vouchers as subsidizing private religious schools only by virtue of parental choice. 74 Second, government displays of religious symbols, such as the Ten Commandments, will not violate the Establishment Clause so long as the religious message is not dominant. 75 This means government is free to display religious symbols, as long as it is careful to disguise its real purpose and include enough nonreligious content to discount the religious nature of the display. Another way for government to proliferate the display of religious symbols on its property is to create a limited public forum in which private parties are allowed to display items, including religious symbols. 77 This is a bit risky because disfavored religions might decide to take advantage of the forum and display unpopular symbols. The exception is for cases where plaintiffs challenge "exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution," on the grounds that the spending at issue "exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power," such as the Establishment Clause. 81 As a result, in Flast, the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with their federal court litigation seeking to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds, pursuant to Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 82 on the grounds that the funds were being used to finance instruction in religious schools, as well as the purchase of textbooks and other instructional material. 83 However, the Flast exception has been narrowed to the point that it covers nothing other than Flast itself. 89 Of course, the decision in Zelman, approving education vouchers, opens the door to government subsidizing prayer and religious worship at private religious schools.
90
While there are restrictions on government-sponsored prayer as part of government activities, the amount of government subsidies provided to religious institutions is staggering. 91 Justice O'Connor touched on this in her concurring opinion in Zelman, in which she said the $8.2 million of public funds that flowed to religious schools in Cleveland in one year "is no small sum, [but] it pales in comparison to the amount of funds that federal, state, and local governments already provide religious institutions."
92
She then summarized the ways in which government subsidizes religious institutions, with some indications of the amount of money at stake.
93
Although the Establishment Clause is supposed to be a co-guarantor of religious freedom, 94 it no longer does much of the heavy lifting. Justice Kagan, in dissent, says this "novel distinction . . . has as little basis in principle as it has in our precedent" because "[e]ither way, the government has financed the religious activity." Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting Maybe those truly interested in religious freedom should spend more resources promoting a robust Establishment Clause, rather than attempting to place themselves above the law. Neither the Catholic Bishops nor the church in Hosanna-Tabor appears concerned about government subsidizing religion.
IV. APPLICATION OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES TO CATHOLIC BISHOPS' LITIGATION AND HOSANNA-TABOR
The Court, in Hosanna-Tabor, adopted a "ministerial exception" to the application of the retaliation provision in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to a religious institution. 95 In short, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Perich, a teacher at a small school operated by HosannaTabor, alleging that she had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file an ADA lawsuit.
96 Hosanna-Tabor alleged that it discharged her for "'insubordination and disruptive behavior' . . . as well as . . . damage she had done to her 'working relationship' with the school by 'threatening to take legal action. '" 97 In seeking summary judgment, Hosanna-Tabor claimed Perich was a minister who had been fired for a religious reason-"that her threat to sue the Church violated the Synod's belief that Christians should resolve their disputes internally." 98 The trial court agreed that the suit was barred by the ministerial exception; however, the court of appeals reversed, stating that Perich did not qualify as a minister because her duties as a "called" teacher were identical to her duties as a lay teacher.
99
In a unanimous decision, with several concurring opinions, the Court sided with Hosanna-Tabor:
We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon 
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CATHOLIC BISHOPS 9 6 7 more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.
100
Even though the Court recognized that the ADA prohibition on retaliation is a valid and neutral law of general applicability, it held that Smith does not control the case because it "involved government regulation of only outward physical acts," while this case "concern[ed] government interference with an internal church decision that affect[ed] the faith and mission of the church itself." 101 Instead of relying on Smith, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor relied on two other cases. 102 In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, the Court held that applying a New York statute to determine which archbishop had the right to use a cathedral violated the First Amendment because the controversy over the right to use the cathedral was "strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government." 103 In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, the Court overturned an Illinois Supreme Court decision purporting to reinstate a removed bishop because the proceedings resulting in his removal failed to comply with church laws and regulations. 104 The Court reversed the state supreme court because it had "unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals" of the church. 105 These MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [ 9 7 : 4 cases, according to the Court, "confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church's determination of who can act as its ministers."
106
After concluding that the religion clauses of the First Amendment require a ministerial exception to at least some cases brought under a federal antidiscrimination law, the Court had to decide whether the exception applies in the Hosanna-Tabor situation. 107 First, the Court concluded that the "exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation," but the Court did not "adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister."
108 Rather, the Court simply concluded that "the exception covers [Ms.] Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment."
109
Several factors led to this conclusion: the formal title, "Minister of Religion, Commissioned"; the substance reflected in the title-"a significant degree of religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning"; and the important religious functions Ms. Perich performed for the church-"conveying the Church's message and carrying out its mission," "'lead[ing] others toward Christian maturity,'" and "'teach [ing] faithfully the Word of God, the Sacred Scriptures, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. '" 110 Ironically, determining who is a minister, for purposes of applying the ministerial exception, brings the courts much closer to deciding religious doctrine than does the determination of whether a particular prohibited characteristic, such as race, sex, or disability, was a motivating factor in the challenged adverse employment action.
111
The Court identified three errors committed by the court of appeals-the failure to find relevance in the fact that Perich was a commissioned minister, according "too much weight to the fact that lay teachers at the school performed the same religious duties as Perich," and placing too much emphasis on the amount of time Perich spent performing religious functions.
112 Although Perich abandoned her claim for reinstatement, the Court found that immaterial because she In response to the suggestion "that Hosanna-Tabor's asserted religious reason for firing Perich-that she violated the Synod's commitment to internal dispute resolution-was pretextual," the Court stated that the "suggestion misses the point" because the "purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church's decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason," rather, the exception "ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful-a matter 'strictly ecclesiastical,'-is the church's alone."
115
In an apparent attempt to limit its decision, the Court stated:
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church's decision to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.
116
Despite the Court's attempt to limit its decision to the situation presented by Ms. Perich's discharge, 117 The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.
122
If the First Amendment has really "struck the balance for us," presumably the Court would refuse to allow society's great interest in eliminating race discrimination in employment to trump the First Amendment interest in religious freedom. 123 Of course, a court with a different view of race discrimination could conclude that the Thirteenth Amendment, along with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "has struck the balance for us."
124 At least in cases where, for example, race or sex discrimination in the selection of a minister is The brief Establishment Clause portion of the decision in HosannaTabor, holding that "[a]ccording the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause,"
126 is a bit curious. While that statement may be true, it does not fit the facts because the antidiscrimination laws do not really give "the state the power to determine which individuals will [be employed]" by religious institutions. 127 Rather, under those laws, employers retain wide discretion in determining whom their employees will be, losing only the discretion to discriminate "because of" certain prohibited factors.
128
The common thread between the Catholic Bishops' litigation and Hosanna-Tabor is that the religious institutions in both cases are seeking an exemption from religion-neutral, employment-related laws of general applicability, i.e., seeking "to become a law unto [themselves] ." 129 In both situations, the religious institution has opted to get into the business of employing people, but having done so, it does not want to MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [ 9 7 : 4 play by the rules governing other employers. 130 Hosanna-Tabor wanted to be treated differently than other employers, i.e., it sought, and obtained from the Supreme Court, an exemption that allows it to discriminate and retaliate in at least some circumstances.
131
The Catholic Bishops seek a similar exemption from a provision in the PPACA 132 that requires non-grandfathered plans and issuers to provide, among other preventive services identified in guidelines adopted by Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), contraceptive services.
133
The guidelines include a note referring to a regulation authorizing HRSA to establish exemptions from the contraceptive-services requirement for health plans established and maintained by "religious employers." 134 A "religious employer" is defined as an organization that meets four criteria: (1) its purpose is the "inculcation of religious values"; (2) it employs primarily "persons who share [its] religious tenets"; (3) it "serves primarily persons who share [its] religious tenets"; and (4) it "is a nonprofit organization," as described in the Internal Revenue Code. 135 As stated above, the ADA provides a statutory defense for religious entities, allowing them to give a "preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion to 130 . The Catholic organizations challenging the contraceptive-services requirement not only opted to get in the business of employing people, they also opted to get in the business of providing health coverage. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. In commenting on proposed final rules related to the controversial requirement, "[s]ome religiously-affiliated employers warned that, if the definition of religious employer is not broadened, they could cease to offer health coverage to their employees in order to avoid having to offer coverage to which they object on religious grounds. Another common thread between the Catholic Bishops' litigation and Hosanna-Tabor may be the organizations' insensitivity to gender equity in the workplace. 138 As noted by Professor Griffin in her article, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, the victims of the ministerial exception are frequently women.
139
The comments accompanying the final rules implementing the contraception-services requirement state: "Congress determined that both existing health coverage and existing preventive services recommendations often did not adequately serve the unique health needs of women" and that the "disparity places women in the workforce at a disadvantage compared to their male co-workers." 140 Further, the contraceptive coverage requirement is "designed to serve the compelling public health and gender equity goals" identified above.
141
In fact, this requirement will actually save money for the employers.
142
The Catholic Bishops attempt to avoid the holding in Smith by "arguing" in their complaint that the contraception requirement is "not a neutral law of general applicability because it is riddled with exemptions for which there is not a consistent, legally defensible basis," in that "[i]t offers multiple exemptions from its requirement that employer-based health plans include or facilitate coverage for abortioninducing drugs, sterilization, contraception, and related education and at 8727 (citing a 2000 study estimating "that it would cost employers 15 to 17 percent more not to provide contraceptive coverage in employee health plans than to provide such coverage, after accounting for both the direct medical costs of pregnancy and the indirect costs such as employee absence and reduced productivity").
Bishops' litigation? 149 In Smith, the Court said the "right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" 150 Unless the right of free exercise means something different for a religious "institution" than it means for an "individual," this sentence should end the discussion. It does not appear that the litigation supported by the Catholic Bishops will require the courts to get involved in the selection of ministers or the interpretation of Catholic faith and doctrine.
Unlike the plaintiff in Smith, the Catholic institutions challenging the PPACA in the litigation organized by the Catholic Bishops have a claim based on RFRA. 151 This Act, found unconstitutional in Flores as applied to state and local government, 152 attempts to restore strict scrutiny analysis to Free Exercise Clause claims, and the Court has not decided whether RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal government. 153 At least one court of appeals has rejected a RFRA claim in a case challenging the "individual mandate" portion of the PPACA.
154
In sum, the claims asserted in the Catholic Bishops' sponsored litigation challenging the contraception services requirement imposed by PPACA and implementing regulations should face an uphill battle, at least under current interpretation of the First Amendment. Of course, the same was true of the challenge in Hosanna-Tabor, which resulted in a unanimous decision in favor of the religious institution.
155
HosannaTabor confirms that "separation of church and state," at least as understood until the Rehnquist Court began to shrink the Establishment Clause, is clearly a doctrine of the past. 156 It remains to be seen whether RFRA will trump the controversial provision in the PPACA. 157 
V. CONCLUSION
My initial reaction to the decision in Smith was that the Court got it wrong. I thought that Free Exercise Clause claims should trigger strict scrutiny so non-mainstream religions, those least powerful in the political process, 158 would have a better chance of protecting themselves through litigation. A few years after Smith, the decision in Lukumi provided some comfort, as the Court held that strict scrutiny still controls Free Exercise Clause challenges to laws that are neither religion-neutral nor of general applicability. 159 It also became apparent, as religions proliferated in this country, that imposing on legislative bodies the equivalent of a religious impact statement for each piece of legislation could make it very difficult to govern. 160 Further, the tension between the two religion clauses increases as the Free Exercise Clause gets larger, i.e., Establishment Clause concerns are greater when the Free Exercise Clause is interpreted as requiring religion-based exemptions from religion-neutral laws of general applicability. 161 Finally, the shrinking of the Establishment Clause, to the point that there are virtually no constitutional checks on governmental subsidies to religious institutions, should be accompanied by fewer Constitutionimposed exemptions for religious institutions to avoid giving such institutions an advantage over competing nonreligious institutions. For example, the Catholic institutions that are plaintiffs in the litigation promoted by the Catholic Bishops may be subsidized by the government, like their nonreligious competition, but they are seeking an advantage in the form of an exemption from certain requirements of the PPACA. 162 For these reasons, I have changed my view of Smith. The proliferation of exemptions over the years has created a sense of entitlement. When religious institutions are not successful in obtaining an exemption through the legislative process, they may seek a First Amendment-based exemption from the courts, as in Hosanna-Tabor. 163 Further, when religious institutions are partially successful in obtaining exemptions through the legislative process, as they were with PPACA,
